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ARTICLES
BRINGING DEFERENCE BACK (BUT FOR HOW
LONG?): JUSTICE ALITO, CHEVRON, AUER, AND
CHENERY IN THE SUPREME COURT'S 2006 TERM
Stephen M. Johnson'
I. INTRODUCTION
For most of the past decade, the Supreme Court seemed to be
gradually eroding the deference accorded to administrative agencies. In
Christensen v. Harris County and United States v. Mead Corp.' the Court
refused to accord Chevron deference3 to agencies' interpretations of
statutes when the agencies adopted those interpretations through
informal procedures.4 The trend appeared to continue when the Court
refused to accord Chevron deference to tobacco regulations adopted by
the Food and Drug Administration in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.5 or to controlled substance regulations adopted by the
Attorney General in Gonzales v. Oregon.6 In addition, the Court cited
Chevron less frequently in recent Terms.7 Academics suggested that
Associate Dean and Professor, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law.
1. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
2. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
3. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. In Chevron, the
Supreme Court created a two-step test for judicial review of agency interpretations of
statutes. Id. at 842-43. At Step One, the reviewing court asks "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, . . . the
court must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. However,
"if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," id. at 843, the court
should defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute as long as it is reasonable, id. at
843-44.
4. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586-87. Although the
Court did not accord Chevron deference to the agencies' decisions, in both cases the Court
suggested that the decisions were entitled to deference under the Court's ruling in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227; Christensen, 529
U.S. at 587.
5. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
6. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
7. See Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to
Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725,772-73 (2007).
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these factors signaled a trend away from Chevron's call for judicial
deference to agency interpretations of statutes.s
At the same time that the Court seemed to be reducing the deference
accorded to agency interpretations of statutes, the Court also seemed to
be reducing the deference accorded to an agency's interpretation of its
own regulations. The Court's 1997 Auer v. Robbins opinion reaffirmed
that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to
substantial deference, 9 but academics expressed concerns about the
vitality of Auer in the wake of the Court's 2001 opinion in Mead.'° The
Court created an exception to Auer in Gonzales, when it refused to defer
to the Attorney General's interpretation of his rules."
To the extent that the Court's opinions over the last decade suggested
an erosion of deference, Justice Alito's elevation to the Court and the
opinions that the Court issued in the 2006 Term suggest that the
pendulum has swung back towards agency deference, at least for the time
being. Although the Court did not overturn any major administrative
law precedents, it interpreted many of them in a significantly pro-
government manner.
The shift is most apparent in the Court's Chevron jurisprudence in the
2006 Term. Eight of the Court's opinions either applied Chevron or
examined whether application of Chevron was appropriate in the case."
More significant than the number of Chevron citations is the manner in
which the Court applied Chevron. Where in prior Terms the Court
seemed to be reducing the situations in which Chevron applied in prior
Terms, in the 2006 Term the Court expanded the reach of Chevron when
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (stating that an agency's interpretation
of its own regulations is "controlling unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation."' (quoting Roberson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989))).
10. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
11. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 256-57.
12. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007);
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007); Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559
(2007); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007); Global
Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513 (2007);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007); Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct.
1423 (2007). The Court cited Chevron in the Duke Energy case, but did not cite it for the
two-part test. See Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. at 1428. Nevertheless, the Court applied the
Chevron analysis in the case when it determined that the EPA's regulations could be
upheld despite the ambiguous language in the Clean Air Act as long as the agency's
interpretation of the statute was reasonable. Id. at 1434. In addition to the eight cases
cited above, two other cases cited Chevron on tangential matters. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2781 n.18 (2007); Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2515 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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it applied the test to review an agency's denial of a petition for
rulemaking in Massachusetts v. EPA." Furthermore, in two of the cases,
Watters v. Wachovia Bank 4 and National Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife," the Court deferred to agencies' statutory
interpretations on issues-federalism and conflicting statutes-that
seemed to be within the province of the Court, rather than that of the
agencies."
Another subtle shift towards agency deference is apparent in the
manner in which several of the Court's opinions have blurred the steps of
the Chevron analysis." For more than a decade, courts have focused
increasingly on a textualist approach to answer the question posed at
Chevron Step One-"whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue."" Many academics argue that judges who
apply a textualist approach at Chevron Step One may be more likely to
invalidate agency interpretations of statutes. 9 While the Supreme
Court's opinions in the 2006 Term continued to adopt a textualist
approach at Step One, the opinions seem to be reducing both the
importance of the traditional order of analysis in the Chevron test and
the importance of Step One by blurring the steps and considering
legislative history and purpose more directly in evaluating the validity of
agency interpretations. 0
The shift toward greater deference to agencies in the Court's recent
Term was also apparent in cases involving the application of Auer v.
Robbins. While Gonzales seemed to signal a shift away from Auer
deference for an agency's interpretations of its regulations, the Court
applied Auer in two cases in the 2006 Term to uphold agencies'
interpretations of their rules.2 Arguably, the Court even strengthened
the Auer standard in those cases because, in both cases, the Court
13. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1459.
14. 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
15. 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
16. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
18. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984);
see also infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in
State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 681-82 & n.151 (2000); see
also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 828 (2006); Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 521.
20. See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
21. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007);
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007).
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deferred to agency interpretations that had changed over time.22  In
Gonzales, the Court had implied that Auer deference should not be
21accorded to agency interpretations that change over time.
The deferential treatment that the Court accorded agencies in the 2006
Term was apparent outside of the Chevron and Auer arena as well. In
National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court
appeared to ignore-or at least stretch-the "hoary" administrative law
24precedent, SEC v. Chenery Corp., when it upheld the EPA's decision to
transfer water pollution permitting authority to the State of Arizona on
grounds other than those the EPA articulated when it approved the
transfer. 25 Finally, in Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., the
Court strongly suggested that the EPA could interpret, by regulation, the
identical term that was used in two different sections of the Clean Air
Act differently for each section.26
The Court accorded greater deference to agencies on many issues and
doctrines, and ultimately upheld the agencies' decisions in six of the eight
Chevron cases mentioned above." An analysis of the voting records of
individual Justices in these cases demonstrates that Justices Alito and
Kennedy had the greatest impact on the development of administrative
28law in the 2006 Term. Justice Alito voted to uphold the government'sactions more than any other Justice; he only voted against the
22. See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
23. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257-58 (2006).
24. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
25. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2544 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Chenery, 318 U.S. at 87).
26. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1433-34 (2007).
27. The six cases in which the Court upheld positions advanced by the government
were National Ass'n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2524-25 (majority opinion), Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2344 (2007), Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
127 S. Ct. 1559, 1564-65 (2007), Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't. of Education, 127
S. Ct. 1534, 1537-38 (2007), Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms.,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513, 1516 (2007), and Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. at 1428. The two cases in
which the Court did not uphold positions advanced by the government were Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165-66 (2007), and Massachusetts v. EPA,
127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007).
28. While Justice Breyer is Chevron's strongest critic on the Court and Justice Scalia
is Chevron's strongest proponent, these two Justices often counterbalance each other in
voting. In the eight cases discussed above, Justices Breyer and Scalia voted on opposite
sides in six of them. The only cases in which they voted on the same side were Long
Island Care at Home and Duke Energy, both of which were unanimous opinions. Long
Island Care at Home, 127 S. Ct. at 2343; Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. at 1427. While Justices
Breyer and Scalia have had the most to say about Chevron in their opinions, Justices Alito
and Kennedy have had the most say about Chevron's application and in the development
of administrative law in the 2006 Term. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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government in one of the eight cases. 29 Justice O'Connor, whom he
replaced, had voted to validate agency actions far less frequently.0 Thus,
Justice Alito's addition to the Court appears to be the greatest impetus
for the increased deference to agencies. While Justice Alito was the most
pro-government Justice, Justice Kennedy's influence must also be
acknowledged. Justice Kennedy voted with the majority in every one of
the eight cases discussed above. His vote was especially crucial because
five of those eight cases were decided by a five-Justice majority." As in
many areas outside of administrative law these days, as goes Justice
Kennedy, so goes the Court.32
While the Court seemed to accord greater deference to agencies in the
2006 Term, there is reason to believe that the increased deference may
be transitory. A recent study by Professors Thomas Miles and Cass
Sunstein found that while the conservative Justices on the Supreme
Court are less likely to validate agency decisions than the liberal Justices
on the Court, the most conservative members of the Court have been
much more willing to validate agency decisions since President George
W. Bush took office than they were when President Clinton was in
office.33 In that study, the voting patterns of Justice O'Connor did not
appear to be significantly affected by the identity of the administration in
power.'4 Justice Alito's replacement of Justice O'Connor, combined with
his significantly higher rate of validation for agency decisions, seems to
have tipped the balance in favor of deference for agencies for the time
being. However, if the premise of the Miles and Sunstein study is
correct, the conservative Justices who are deferring to agency decisions
by the current administration may be less likely to defer to decisions of a
different administration. Because the Court in the 2006 Term did not
overrule any significant administrative law precedent or purport to make
any significant changes to Chevron, Auer, or Chenery, the Court could
29. Ledbetter was the only case in which Justice Alito took a position that opposed
the government's. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
30. In a study of the voting records of Supreme Court Justices in Chevron cases,
Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein found that Justice O'Connor validated agency
actions in 67% of the Chevron cases in which she participated. Miles & Sunstein, supra
note 19, at 832 tbl.1. By contrast, Justice Alito validated agency actions in only 12.5%
(1/8) of the Chevron decisions in which he participated. See supra note 30.
31. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2524 (5-4 decision); Ledbetter, 127
S. Ct. at 2165 (same); Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1563-64 (5-3 decision); Zuni, 127 S. Ct. at 1537
(5-4 decision); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1444 (same).
32. In the 2006 Term, the Supreme Court decided 24 of the 68 cases by 5-4 votes, and
Justice Kennedy was in the majority in every one of those cases. Stewart M. Jay, Middle
Man, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 22, 2007, at I1.
33. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 19, at 823.
34. Id. at 832 tbl.1, 833.
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reduce the deference it accords to agency decisions as quickly as it has
seemingly increased it.
There is an alternative, less cynical explanation for the Court's
resolution of Chevron cases in the 2006 Term. In a recent article
attempting to explain the Court's reluctance to accord Chevron
deference to agency decisions in the Brown & Williamson and Gonzales
cases, Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman posits that courts will overturn
agency decisions, despite Chevron deference, when agencies "act[]
undemocratically either by disregarding likely congressional preferences
or public engagement on an issue of social concern."35 Bressman's theory
seems to be supported by the Court's resolution of the Chevron cases in
the 2006 Term.36
This Article explores the eight major Chevron-related opinions of the
2006 Term and the general trend toward increased deference for
administrative agencies in those decisions. Part II of this Article briefly
describes the disputes and holdings of the cases. Part III examines the
apparent trend away from Chevron in prior years and the revitalization
of Chevron in the 2006 Term. Part IV explores the other ways that the
Court increased the deference accorded to agencies, including the
rejuvenation of Auer and the strained application of Chenery. Finally,
Part V explores some of the reasons for the shift towards increased
deference for agencies and examines the potentially transitory nature of
the shift.
II. THE CHEVRON EIGHT
The Supreme Court either applied Chevron or examined whether
Chevron was applicable in eight cases during the 2006 Term.37 The Court
38ruled in favor of the government in six of those cases. The cases aredescribed in the following sections.
A. Cases Decided in Favor of the Government
1. National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife
The most fractured and convoluted of the Chevron opinions was
authored by Justice Alito, for a 5-4 Court, in National Ass'n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife.3 9 The case involved a challenge to the
35. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761,
798 (2007).
36. See infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
37. See cases cited supra note 12.
38. See cases cited supra note 27.
39. 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2524 (2007).
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Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to transfer water
pollution permitting authority under the Clean Water Act (CWA) to the
State of Arizona. ° Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act identifies nine
criteria that state permitting programs must meet in order for a state to
obtain permitting authority under the CWA. The statute provides that
the EPA "'shall approve each submitted program"' for transfer of
permitting authority "'unless [it] determines that adequate authority
does not exist"' to ensure that the criteria are met.4' A separate federal
statute, the Endangered Species Act (ESA), provides in section 7(a)(2)
that federal agencies must consult with agencies within the Department
of the Interior or the Department of Commerce to "'insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species.' 42 The EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) of the Department of the Interior as required by section 7
of the ESA, and the FWS concluded that the transfer of permitting
authority to Arizona would not jeopardize endangered or threatened
species. 43 The EPA concluded that Arizona's application for permitting
authority met the nine criteria of the CWA and transferred permitting
authority to the State.44
Defenders of Wildlife challenged the EPA's decision to transfer
permitting authority to Arizona. 45 Although the EPA, when it approved
the transfer of permitting authority to Arizona, had suggested that the
transfer complied with section 7 of the ESA,46 the EPA changed its
position during the course of litigation and argued that section 7 did not
apply to the agency's determination of whether it was appropriate to
transfer permitting authority under the CWA.47  Following the
commencement of the litigation in the lower court, in the context of
reviewing an application from the State of Alaska for transfer of CWA
permitting authority, the EPA, FWS, and National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) issued memoranda concluding that the consultation
process required by section 7(a)(2) of the ESA did not apply to a request
for a transfer of permitting authority under section 402(b) of the CWA 8
While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
40. Id. at 2525.
41. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000)) (alteration in original).
42. Id. at 2526 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000)).
43. Id. at 2527.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2528.
46. Id. at 2527-28.
47. Id. at 2529-31.
48. Id. at 2530 & n.5.
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EPA's reliance on the new interpretation of section 7(a)(2) was arbitrary
and capricious, the Supreme Court was not troubled by the EPA's
change in position. The majority noted that its administrative law
precedent required that it "'uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if
the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.' 49 The Court then
concluded that the EPA had not acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
retreating from its earlier statements that the transfer complied with
section 7 of the ESA." Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens pointed
out that:
We have long held . . . that courts may not affirm an agency
action on grounds other than those adopted by the agency in
the administrative proceedings. See SEC v. Chenery Corp ...
The majority ignores this hoary principle of administrative law
and substitutes a post-hoc interpretation of [the ESA and a key
regulatory provision] ... for that of the relevant agency."
After the Court determined that the EPA did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously by taking a position in litigation that was contrary to the
position that it took at the time of its decision to transfer permitting
authority, the Court reviewed the EPA's interpretation of the conflicting
statutes. Justice Alito, for the majority, framed the issue as "a clash of
seemingly categorical -and, at first glance, irreconcilable -legislative
commands."52 He noted that CWA section 402(b) "provides, without
qualification, that the EPA 'shall approve' a transfer application unless it
determines that the State lacks adequate authority to perform the nine
functions specified" therein.53  Moreover, Justice Alito found the
language of ESA section 7(a)(2) to be "similarly imperative. 5 4 Whereas
section 7(a)(2), on its face, seemed to apply to all agency actions,
including the EPA's decision to approve a transfer of permitting
authority under the CWA, Justice Alito argued that such an
interpretation of the ESA would "implicit[ly] repeal" the CWA by
adding a "tenth criterion" to the standards for approving transfers of
permitting authority under section 402(b).55
49. Id. at 2530 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983)).
50. Id. at 2530-31.
51. Id. at 2544 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87
(1943)).
52. Id. at 2531 (majority opinion).
53. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000)).
54. Id. at 2532.
55. Id. at 2532-33.
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While Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the Court could interpret
the two statutes in a manner that would give full effect to both,56 the
majority decided instead to review the Agency's action under Chevron.7
The majority determined, at Chevron Step One, that the statutory
conflict rendered the language of the ESA ambiguous. Consequently,
the majority examined a regulation adopted by the FWS and the NMFS,
the agencies responsible for administering ESA section 7, which
provided that "'[s]ection 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all
actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.' 59
Although the regulation, on its face, did not provide that section 7 only
applies to actions where there is discretionary federal involvement or
control, the majority read the regulation to be so limited, and concluded
that the regulation was reasonable and therefore entitled to Chevron
deference. 60 On that reading, because the EPA did not have discretion to
deny a request to transfer the water pollution permitting program to
Arizona under section 402(b) if the nine criteria in that section were met,
the EPA would not be required to comply with section 7 in making the
transfer determination.
The Court bolstered its holding by noting that the EPA, FWS, and
NMFS had each interpreted the regulations of the ESA to exclude
decisions regarding the transfer of permitting authority under the CWA
section 402(b) from the requirements of ESA section 7.61 Even though
the agencies had previously interpreted the regulations to require
consultation under section 7 for transfers of permitting authority under
the CWA, and had changed their interpretations in a different
proceeding than the one under review by the Court-subsequent to the
commencement of the litigation before the Court-the majority, relying
on Auer v. Robbins, held that "[an agency's interpretation of the
meaning of its own regulations is entitled to deference 'unless plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, and that deferential
standard is plainly met here.
'' 62
56. Id. at 2538 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2534-35 (majority opinion).
58. Id. at 2534.
59. Id. at 2533 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2000)).
60. Id. at 2534-35. The dissent argued, on the other hand, that the regulation merely
confirmed that section 7 applied to discretionary agency actions as well as non-
discretionary actions. Id. at 2542 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2537 (majority opinion).
62. Id. at 2537-38 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
2007]
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2. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., et al v. Coke
A few weeks prior to the Court's National Ass'n of Home Builders
decision, a unanimous Court upheld Department of Labor (DOL)
regulations in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., et al v. Coke." The case
involved the DOL's interpretation of a provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) that exempts certain "'domestic service"'
employees who provide "'companionship services"' from the statute's
minimum wage and maximum hours rules.64 The DOL issued two
potentially conflicting regulations through notice and comment
rulemaking. The first regulation, which was included in a subpart of the
rulemaking entitled "'General Regulations"' defined "'domestic service
employment"' as "'services of a household nature performed by an
employee in or about a private home ... of the person by whom he or
she is employed."'65 The second regulation, referred to by the Court as
the "'third-party regulation,"' was included in a different subpart of the
rulemaking entitled "'Interpretations"' and provided that "exempt
companionship workers include those 'who are employed by an
employer or agency other than the family or household using their
services... [whether or not] such an employee [is assigned] to more than
one household or family in the same workweek.' 66
Evelyn Coke, a domestic worker, provided companionship services to
the elderly; she sued her former employer, Long Island Care at Home,
Ltd., to recover unpaid wages, alleging that her employer failed to
comply with the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the
FLSA.67 The employer claimed, however, that the third-party regulation
61
exempted employees like Coke from coverage under the Act.
As in the National Ass'n of Home Builders case, the Court analyzed
the statutory interpretation issue through the Chevron framework.
Justice Breyer wrote that Chevron deference was appropriate because
"[t]he subject matter of the regulation in question concerns a matter in
respect to which the agency is expert, and it concerns an interstitial
matter, i.e., a portion of a broader definition, the details of which ...
Congress entrusted the agency to work out. ' 69 The Court determined
that neither the text nor the statute's legislative history clearly answered
63. 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007).
64. Id. at 2344 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2000)).
65. Id. at 2344-45 (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 7405 (1975) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 552.3
(2006))) (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original).
66. Id. at 2345 (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. at 7407 (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a)
(2006))) (alterations in original).
67. Id. at 2345.
68. Id. at 2345-46.
69. Id. at 2346.
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the question of whether domestic service workers employed by a third
party were exempt from the FLSA.70 Consequently, the Court examined
the agency's regulations. Although the DOL's third-party regulation
conflicted with its own general rule that defined domestic service
employees, the Court determined that the third-party regulation should
control over the general regulation because the Agency had issued an
"'Advisory Memorandum"' to internal agency personnel, in which the
agency took the position that the third-party regulation should control.71
The Court noted that the Agency's interpretation of its regulations had
changed over time and that the most recent interpretation appeared to
be prepared in response to the litigation, but the Court nevertheless held:
We have "no reason" . . . "to suspect that [this] interpretation"
is merely a "'post hoc rationalizatio[n]"' of past agency action,
or that it "does not reflect the agency's fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question." Where, as here, an
agency's course of action indicates that the interpretation of its
own regulation reflects its considered views . . .we have
accepted that interpretation as the agency's own, even if the
agency set those views forth in a legal brief.
For all these reasons, we conclude that the Department's
interpretation of the two regulations falls well within the
principle that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is
''controlling" unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with"
72the regulations being interpreted.
The Court also addressed Coke's claim that the third-party regulation
was not entitled to Chevron deference because it was an interpretive
rule 3  While the Court did not ultimately determine whether the
regulation was or was not an interpretive rule,74 the Court reasoned that
the regulation was entitled to Chevron deference because (1) it "directly
govern[ed] the conduct of members of the public, 'affecting individual
rights and obligations"'; (2) in rulemaking, the DOL "used full public
notice-and-comment procedures"; and (3) the DOL had "treated the
third-party regulation as a binding exercise of its rulemaking authority.,
75
The Court explained that:
Where an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and
duties, where the agency focuses fully and directly upon the
issue, where the agency uses full notice-and-comment
70. Id. at 2347.
71. Id. at 2349.
72. Id. (citations omitted) (first alteration in original).
73. Id. at 2349-50.
74. See id. at 2349-51.
75. Id. at 2350.
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procedures to promulgate a rule, where the resulting rule falls
within the statutory grant of authority, and where the rule itself
is reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes that Congress
intended it to defer to the agency's determination. 76
3. Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education
Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education
centered on an interpretation of education funding provisions in the
Federal Impact Aid Act (IAA).7' The statute "provides financial
assistance to local school districts whose ability to finance public school
education is adversely affected by a federal presence," such as a military
78base, which would not be subject to local property taxes. The statute
prohibits states from reducing their aid to local school districts that
receive federal aid, but includes an exemption allowing states to reduce
their aid to those districts if the state implements a program to equalize
expenditures for public schools in the state.79 The Secretary of Education
must follow a statutory formula that compares the per-pupil expenditures
of the local school districts to determine whether the state program
equalizes expenditures. 8° In making the comparison of expenditures
among school districts, the statute requires the Secretary to "'disregard
[school districts] with per pupil expenditures . . . above the 95th
percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures.'"
8
1
Over thirty years ago, the Department of Education adopted
regulations to implement the statute, including the "disregard"
provision. The regulations that the Agency adopted to identify the
school districts to disregard provide that the Agency should make the
determination based on the student population of each districts." The
Secretary relied on that regulation to conclude that the State of New
Mexico equalized expenditures among school districts and could,
therefore, reduce state aid to several districts to offset the aid provided to
them under the IAA.84  Two of the school districts impacted by that
decision challenged it, arguing that the Agency's regulations were
inconsistent with the IAA, and that in deciding which school districts to
76. Id. at 2350-51.
77. 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1538 (2007).
78. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. IV 2000)).
79. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(1)).
80. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(A)).
81. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i)) (emphasis added) (alterations in
original).
82. Id. at 1538-39 (quoting 34 C.F.R. pt. 222, subpt. K, app. at para. 1 (2006)).
83. Id. at 1539 (quoting 34 C.F.R. pt. 222, subpt. K, app. at para. 1 (2006)).
84. Id. at 1540.
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disregard, the Secretary of Education should focus on the number of
school districts rather than the student population of those districts.!
Justice Breyer began his opinion for the 5-4 Court by citing Chevron
for the proposition that "if the language of the statute is open or
ambiguous-that is, if Congress left a 'gap' for the agency to fill-then
we must uphold the Secretary's interpretation as long as it is
reasonable." 86 Although Justice Breyer seemed to frame the Chevron
Step One analysis as a textual analysis, he did not begin his Chevron
analysis with Step One. Instead, he wrote:
For purposes of exposition, we depart from a normal order of
discussion, namely an order that first considers Zuni's statutory
language argument. Instead, because of the technical nature of
the language in question, we shall first examine the provision's
background and basic purposes. That discussion will illuminate
our subsequent analysis [of the statutory text] .... 87
He proceeded to conclude that the Agency's interpretation of the
statute was consistent with its legislative history and purpose, 8 and that
the issue to be resolved in Zuni was an appropriate issue for deference
because it was "the kind of highly technical, specialized interstitial matter
that Congress often does not decide itself, but delegates to specialized
agencies to decide."8 9  Justice Breyer then examined the text of the
statute itself and concluded that the text alone did not clearly answer the
question before the Court.90 Ultimately, he wrote that "the language of
the statute is broad enough to permit the secretary's reading. That fact
requires us to look beyond the language to determine whether the
Secretary's interpretation is a reasonable, hence permissible
85. Id. Pursuant to the regulation, the Secretary excluded seventeen schools that had
the highest per-pupil expenditure and six schools that had the lowest per-pupil
expenditure from the calculations in determining whether the State program equalized
expenditures. Id. This was because the two groups of schools each cumulatively
constituted five percent or less of the total student population. Id. The challengers argued
that since there were eighty-nine school districts in the State, the Secretary should have
excluded only ten schools from the calculations-the five schools with the highest per-
pupil expenditure and the five schools with the lowest per-pupil expenditure. Id. Were
the Secretary to have applied the formula in the manner suggested by the challengers, the
Secretary would have concluded that New Mexico did not have a funding program that
equalizes expenditures, and New Mexico would not have been permitted to reduce State
aid to the school districts to offset the federal aid that they were receiving. Id.
86. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984)).
87. Id. at 1541 (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 1541-43.
89. Id. at 1541.
90. Id. at 1543-46.
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implementation of the statute. . . .[W]e conclude that the Secretary's
reading is a reasonable reading."9
While Justices Kennedy and Alito joined in the majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion for the pair that criticized
Justice Breyer's inversion of the order of the Chevron analysis. Justice
Kennedy admonished that "[t]he district courts and courts of appeals, as
well as this Court, should follow the framework set forth in Chevron...
even when departure from that framework might serve purposes of
exposition." 92 After reciting the Chevron two-step framework, Justice
Kennedy concluded that:
In this case, the Court is correct to find that the plain
language of the statute is ambiguous. It is proper, therefore, to
invoke Chevron's rule of deference. The opinion of the Court,
however, inverts Chevron's logical progression. Were the
inversion to become systemic, it would create the impression
that agency policy concerns, rather than the traditional tools of
statutory construction, are shaping the judicial interpretation of
statutes.93
Justice Scalia was much more concerned about the implications of
Justice Breyer's method of analysis as a potential erosion of the textualist
approach to Chevron Step One. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia
discussed the Supreme Court's landmark Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States decision, in which the Court broadly interpreted a federal
labor statute to achieve the statute's purpose, even though such an
interpretation stepped beyond the text of the statute. 94 He noted that the
decision was
a judge-empowering proposition if there ever was one, and in
the century since, the Court has wisely retreated from it, in
words if not always in actions. But today Church of the Holy
Trinity arises, Phoenix-like, from the ashes. The Court's
contrary assertions aside, today's decision is nothing other than
the elevation of judge-supposed legislative intent over clear
statutory text9
91. Id. at 1546 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 1550 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1551.
94. See id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United




4. Global Crossing Telecommunications v. Metrophones
Telecommunications
In Global Crossing Telecommunications v. Metrophones
Telecommunications, a payphone operator, Metrophones, sought
compensation from a long distance carrier, Global Crossing, for calls
made by payphone users to access Global Crossing's long distance
services.96 The case focused on the interpretation of several provisions of
the federal telecommunications laws and regulations of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).97
The Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act of
1990, which amended the Communications Act of 1934, required
payphone operators to allow payphone users to access long distance
service providers through payphones without depositing coins.9 8 In order
to ensure that payphone operators were compensated for the use of their
phones for those services, Congress also enacted legislation that directed
the FCC to prescribe regulations "'establish[ing] a per call compensation
plan to ensure that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated
for each and every completed intrastate and interstate call." ' 99 Pursuant
to that legislation, the FCC issued an order mandating that long distance
carriers reimburse payphone operators twenty-four cents for each "free"
(coinless) call placed by a payphone user to the long distance carrier.'O°
Under separate statutory authority, the FCC determined that a long
distance carrier's failure to reimburse a payphone operator for the free
calls was an "'unreasonable practice"' under section 201(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934.101 When Global Crossing refused to
reimburse Metrophone for free calls placed from Metrophone
payphones, Metrophone sued Global Crossing for damages under section
207 of the Act.1°2
Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Breyer began his analysis by noting
that a litigant may bring an action under section 207 for unreasonable
practices that are properly defined as unlawful in FCC rules. 3 The
question for the Court, therefore, was whether the FCC's regulatory
96. 127 S. Ct. 1513, 1516 (2007).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1518 (citing Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act of
1990 § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 226(c) (2000)).
99. Id. (quoting Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A) (2000)).
100. Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300(d) (2005)). The current rate is $0.494 per call. 47
C.F.R. § 64.1300(d) (2006).
101. Global Crossing, 127 S. Ct. at 1517-18 (citing Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000)).
102. Id. at 1518-19 (citing Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 207).
103. Id. at 1515, 1519-20.
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determination that a long distance carrier's failure to reimburse a
payphone operator was an unreasonable practice under section 201(b)
itself was valid. 1°4
Immediately turning to Chevron to resolve the question, Justice Breyer
focused both on the language of section 201(b) and on the nature of the
issue to be resolved in the case. °5 Specifically, he noted that "the
underlying regulated activity at issue here resembles activity that . . .
communications agencies have long regulated" under the authority of
section 201(b).i°6 While he acknowledged that the statutes governing
telecommunications regulation have changed over the years, increasing
the role of competition and decreasing the importance of tariffs, Justice
Breyer noted that "when Congress rewrote the law to bring about these
changes, it nonetheless left § 201(b) in place. That fact indicates.., that
Congress likely expected.., the FCC to pour new substantive wine into
its old regulatory bottles."1 7  He then summarized the standard of
review:
[W]here "Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak
with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute
or fills a space in the enacted law," a court "is obliged to accept
the agency's position if Congress has not previously spoken to
the point at issue and the agency's interpretation" . . . is
"reasonable."1"8
Applying that standard, Justice Breyer concluded that:
Congress, in § 201(b), delegated to the agency authority to "fill"
a "gap," i.e., to apply § 201 through regulations and orders with
the force of law. The circumstances mentioned above make
clear the absence of any relevant congressional prohibition.
And, in light of the traditional regulatory similarities that we
have discussed, we can find nothing unreasonable about the
FCC's § 201(b) determination.'O°
5. Watters v. Wachovia Bank
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided the Zuni and Global
Crossing cases, the Court issued its ruling in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, a
case that focused on whether the National Bank Act (NBA) preempted
104. Id. at 1520.
105. Id. at 1520-22.
106. Id. at 1520 (emphasis omitted).
107. Id. at 1521.
108. Id. at 1522 (quoting in turn United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001);
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
109. Id. (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980-81).
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state regulation of subsidiaries of national banks." ° The dispute in the
case arose when Linda Watters, the commissioner of Michigan's Office
of Insurance and Financial Services, required Wachovia Mortgage to
comply with various licensing, inspection, and reporting requirements of
Michigan's laws governing mortgage lenders, even though Wachovia
Mortgage had recently become a wholly owned subsidiary of Wachovia
Bank, a national banking association."' Wachovia Mortgage and
Wachovia Bank argued that the NBA preempted the application of the
State's requirements to the subsidiary company."'
The NBA governs business activities of national banks and authorizes
them to engage in a variety of activities, including real estate lending."3
It preempts state licensing and registration requirements for national
banks and gives the federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) exclusive authority to inspect and examine national banks. 114 The
law also authorizes national banks to engage in some activities through
their operating subsidiaries."' In 2001, the OCC promulgated
regulations providing that operating subsidiaries of national banks are
subject to state laws only to the extent that national banks are subject to
state laws. 1 6 In the litigation that led to the Supreme Court's review, the
federal district court applied the Chevron test and deferred to the OCC's
regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the NBA."7 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, concluded that the
OCC correctly interpreted the NBA to preempt state laws that require
inspection and examination of operating subsidiaries of national banks,
but the Court suggested that because the statute clearly preempted state
law, it was not necessary to examine the level of deference owed to the
Agency's regulation."
8
110. 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1564 (2007). The three cases were decided on April 17, 2007. Id.
at 1559; Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1534 (2007); Global
Crossing, 127 S. Ct. at 1513.
111. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565-66.
112. Id. at 1565.
113. Id. at 1564 (citing National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (2000)); see also id. at 1566
& n.3 (describing Congress' creation of the national banking system).
114. Id. at 1564 (citing National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)).
115. Id. (citing National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A)).
116. Id. at 1572 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2006)).
117. Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957, 963-65 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
118. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572-73. The Court explained that the regulation "merely
clarifies and confirms what the NBA already conveys: A national bank has the power to
engage in real estate lending through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same Terms
and conditions that govern the national bank itself; that power cannot be significantly
impaired or impeded by state law." Id. at 1572.
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Although the Court claimed that it was not according the OCC's
interpretation Chevron deference, the dissenting Justices were not
convinced. "Whatever the Court says," Justice Stevens wrote, "this is a
case about an administrative agency's power to preempt state laws."" 9
The dissenters argued that the NBA did not clearly address the
preemption issue and that the Court should not accord Chevron
deference to an agency's determination that a federal law does or does
not preempt state law.
6. Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.
In Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., the Court reviewed
regulations issues by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
issued under the Clean Air Act (CAA). 2' The statute's "New Source
Performance Standards" (NSPS) provisions require operators of certain
types of air pollution sources to comply with technology-based standards
established under the statute.122 The standards apply to new sources and
to the modification of older sources. For purposes of the NSPS program,
modification is defined as "'any physical change in, or change in the
method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount
of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the
emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted."1
23
A separate section of the CAA creates a program that is designed for
the "Prevention of Significant Deterioration" (PSD) of the air quality in
areas of the country that are meeting national air quality standards.
The statute requires permits for construction of certain major air
pollution sources in those areas of the country that are covered by the
PSD program.12  It defines construction, for purposes of the PSD
program, as "the modification (as defined in section 7411(a) of this title)
of any source or facility[J" thus explicitly cross-referencing the statutory
119. Id. at 1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1582-85; id. at 1584 ("No case from this Court has ever applied such a
deferential standard to an agency decision that could so easily disrupt the federal-state
balance.").
121. 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2007).
122. Id. (citing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2)
(2000)).
123. Id. (quoting Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. §
7411(a)(4)).
124. Id. at 1428-29 (citing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 127(a), 42 U.S.C. §
7470(1) (2000)).
125. Id. (citing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 127(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)).
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term "modification" that is used in the section of the statute that
addresses the NSPS program.116
The EPA adopted a different regulatory definition for the term
"modification" as used in the PSD program 127 than it adopted for the
term as used in the NSPS program.' 8 The Court succinctly described the
differences between the two regulatory regimes as follows:
(a) The Act defines modification of a stationary source of a
pollutant as a physical change to it, or a change in the method
of its operation, that increases the amount of a pollutant
discharged or emits a new one.
(b) EPA's NSPS regulations require a source to use the best
available pollution-limiting technology only when a
modification would increase the rate of discharge of pollutants
measured in kilograms per hour.
(c) EPA's 1980 PSD regulations require a permit for a
modification (with the same statutory definition) only when it is
a major one and only when it would increase the actual annual
emission of a pollutant above the actual average for the two
prior years.'29
The dispute arose when the EPA sued the owners of several coal-fired
power plants, alleging that the changes that the owner made to the plants
were modifications of the plants that triggered the technology and
permitting requirements of the PSD program in the CAA 3 ° While the
changes made to the plants would not be modifications under the NSPS
program because they did not increase the plants' hourly emission rates,
the changes met the regulatory definition of modifications under the
PSD program because they increased the actual annual emissions of
pollutants from each plant. 3 ' The owner of the power plants thus built
its defense on a challenge to the validity of the EPA's PSD regulations.
126. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 127(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C), discussed in
Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. at 1429.
127. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. at 1429 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i) (1987)). The
Court acknowledged that the EPA had since amended the regulation, but assumed that
the earlier version would control. Id. at 1430 n.4. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i)
(2006), with 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i) (1987).
128. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. at 1428 n.1 (citing § 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(h) (1977)); see also
40 C.F.R. § 60.14(a) (2006).
129. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. at 1430.
130. Id. at 1430-31.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1430-32.
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Although the Court did not explicitly cite the Chevron two-step
analysis,"' it appeared to apply that analysis to the dispute. Justice
Souter, for the majority, began with an analysis of the text of the statute
in light of canons of statutory interpretation.3 He noted that:
[W]e presume that the same term has the same meaning when it
occurs here and there in a single statute . . . . We also
understand that "most words have different shades of meaning
and consequently may be variously construed, not only when
they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once
in the same statute or even in the same section." Thus, the
"natural presumption that identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning...
is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in
the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to
warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different
parts of the act with different intent."...
The point is the same even when the terms share a common
135statutory definition, if it is general enough ....
After holding that there was no bright line rule that required the EPA
to interpret modification consistently for purposes of PSD and NSPS, the
Court, in Chevron-esque language, wrote: "Absent any iron rule to
ignore the reasons for regulating PSD and NSPS 'modifications'
differently, EPA's construction need do no more than fall within the
limits of what is reasonable, as set by the Act's common definition." '136
The Court never determined whether the agency's rule was reasonable,
however. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The majority noted that section 307(b)
of the CAA prohibits judicial review of agency regulations in an
enforcement proceeding, like this one brought by the EPA against the
power plant owner, when the challenge could have been brought within
sixty days after the rules were first promulgated, and implied that
challenges to the PSD rules in an enforcement action would be barred.
137
133. The Court did, however, cite Chevron in its discussion of the structure of the
CAA. Id. at 1428.
134. Id. at 1432-33.
135. Id. at 1432 (quoting At]. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427,
433 (1932)) (second and third alterations in original). The Court emphasized that the
presumption that a term has the same meaning within a single statute is not irrebuttable.
Id.
136. Id. at 1433-34 (footnote omitted).
137. See id. at 1436 (citing Clean Air Act § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2000)).
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B. Cases Decided Against the Government
1. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Court focused on the
pay discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.138 Title VII provides that "it [is] an 'unlawful employment practice'
to discriminate 'against any individual with respect to his compensation.
. . because of such individual's.., sex."'139 However, before an individual
can challenge an employer's actions in court as unlawful employment
practices, the individual must file a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 4° The charge must be filed within a
specified period after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred, which was 180 days in this case.
14 1
In November 1998, Lilly Ledbetter filed a lawsuit against her
employer, Goodyear, alleging that Goodyear discriminated against her in
142
setting her salary while she worked there from 1979 until 1998. Prior to
bringing the lawsuit, in July 1998, she made similar allegations when she
filed an unlawful employment practice charge with the EEOC.
143
Although Ledbetter filed a charge with the EEOC prior to bringing suit,
as required by Title VII, she did not allege that any of Goodyear's
actions in the 180 days before she filed her unlawful employment practice
charge with the EEOC were intentionally discriminatory. '" The Court
noted that, in essence, she argued that the statute should be interpreted
to allow a court to review discriminatory acts that occurred outside of the
requisite 180 day period if those acts had "continuing effects" during the
180 day period. The Court rejected her argument, relying on several
precedents of the Court, and held that "current effects alone cannot
breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination .... Ledbetter should
have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly
discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her. 1 46 The
Court reached its conclusion despite the fact that the EEOC's
Compliance Manual provided that "'repeated occurrences of the same
discriminatory employment action, such as discriminatory paychecks, can
138. 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007).
139. Id. at 2166 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2000)).
140. Id. (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).
141. Id. (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).
142. Id. at 2165.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2167.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2169.
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be challenged as long as one discriminatory act occurred within the
charge filing period,' 147 and despite the fact that the EEOC had taken
that position in other adjudications, including before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in an earlier stage of this case.1
Regarding the Agency's position, the Court noted that it had "previously
declined to extend Chevron deference to the Compliance Manual, and
similarly decline to defer to the EEOC's adjudicatory positions. The
EEOC's views in question are based on its misreading of [our prior
decision in] Bazemore. Agencies have no special claim to deference in
their interpretation of our decisions.
149
2. Massachusetts v. EPA
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court reviewed the EPA's refusal to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles under the Clean Air
Act (CAA)" Section 202 of the CAA provides that the administrator
of the EPA "'shall by regulation prescribe.., standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." '5 1 Under the Act, an air pollutant is
"'any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any
physical, chemical, biological, [or] radioactive . . . substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.' ' ,5 2 In October
1999, nineteen private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with the
EPA, asking the Agency "to regulate 'greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act. '" 5 3 Four years
later, the Agency denied the rulemaking petition, on the grounds that it
147. Id. at 2185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §
2-IV C.1.a, at 605:0024 & n.183 (2006)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2177 n.11 (majority opinion). The dissenting Justices did not suggest that
the EEOC's position was entitled to Chevron deference, but Justice Ginsburg, for the
dissent, wrote:
The Court dismisses the EEOC's considerable "experience and informed
judgment[]" as unworthy of any deference in this case. But the EEOC's
interpretations mirror workplace realities and merit at least respectful attention.
In any event, the level of deference due the EEOC here is an academic question,
for the agency's conclusion that Ledbetter's claim is not time barred is the best
reading of the statute ....
Id. at 2185 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
150. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007).
151. Id. at 1447 (quoting Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)).
152. Id. at 1447 (quoting Clean Air Act § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)) (second
alteration in original).
153. Id. at 1449 (citation omitted).
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lacked the authority "to issue mandatory regulations to address global
climate change," and that it would be unwise to exercise such authority
even if the EPA were so authorized.5 4 The EPA concluded that
greenhouse gases were not air pollutants under the statutory definition."'
Even though the agency action being challenged was a denial of a
rulemaking petition, the Court cited Chevron as the appropriate standard
for reviewing the EPA's decision.156 The Court distinguished an agency's
denial of a rulemaking petition, which it held is reviewable under a
"'highly deferential"' standard, from an agency's refusal to bring an
enforcement action, which it held is generally not reviewable .
Applying the Chevron analysis and stopping at Step One, Justice
Stevens, for a 5-4 majority, reasoned:
On its face, the definition [of air pollutant] embraces all
airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that
intent through the repeated use of the word "any." Carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are
without a doubt "physical [and] chemical ... substance[s] which
[are] emitted into . . . the ambient air." The statute is
unambiguous."'
After the Court concluded, under Chevron, that the EPA could
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under
section 202 of the CAA, it held that the explanation that the EPA gave
for its refusal to make a finding on the impact of greenhouse gases was
arbitrary and capricious.159
III. CHEVRON AND THE 2006 TERM
A. The "Demise" of Chevron - Greatly Exaggerated
At the time that the Court issued its decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council in 1984, many believed that it would usher in
an era of strong deference to agency policymaking.'(6 Indeed, a few years
after the Court's decision, Professors Peter Schuck and Donald Elliott
published a study finding that the rate at which courts rejected agencies'
154. Id. at 1450.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1459 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1460 (footnote omitted) (alterations in original).
159. Id. at 1462-63.
160. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J.
ON REG. 283, 284, 312 (1986).
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statutory interpretations declined by 39% in the year after Chevron.6
However, within a decade after the decision, many academics expressed
skepticism about whether courts were truly according agencies increased
deference under Chevron. By the mid-1990s, some commentators were
convinced that judges were less likely to find statutes ambiguous at
Chevron Step One because judges were increasingly adopting a textualist
approach to statutory interpretation.6 1 Under Chevron, if a statute is not
ambiguous, there is no need to defer to the agency's interpretation of the
statute.16' Thus, many academics suggested that the rise in textualism led
to a decline in Chevron deference.65
The Court's decisions in several cases since the beginning of the
twenty-first century have fueled increased skepticism over the vitality of
Chevron deference. In Christensen v. Harris County16  and United States
v. Mead Corp. ,167 the Court appeared to be reducing the situations in
which the Chevron test should be used to review agency decisions. The
analysis regarding whether courts should apply the Chevron test to
review an agency's decision has been dubbed Chevron Step Zero by
academics. In both Christensen and Mead, the Court concluded that it
was inappropriate to use the Chevron analysis to review decisions made1" 169
by agencies in informal proceedings. While the Court did not establish
161. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study
of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L. J. 984, 1032-34 & tbl.5.
162. See, e.g., John F. Belcaster, The D.C. Circuit's Use of the Chevron Test:
Constructing a Positive Theory of Judicial Obedience and Disobedience, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 745, 754, 764 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,
101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-93 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the
Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 359-63 (1994); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995); Theodore L. Garrett, Judicial
Review After Chevron: The Courts Reassert Their Role, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall
1995, at 59, 78-79.
163. See Schapiro, supra note 19, at 681-82 & n.151 (citing sources supporting the
proposition that "the plain-language focus of the new textualism reduces the instances in
which the courts will find a gap that administrative construction must fill").
164. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
165. Schapiro, supra note 19, at 681 n.149 (collecting sources).
166. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
167. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
168. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 836 (2001); see also Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron's Domain: Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 541, 572 (2007)
(stating that recent commentary focuses on Chevron Step Zero); Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (noting that judicial and academic
attention is now paid to Step Zero decisions).
169. In Christensen, the Court refused to apply Chevron to review an opinion letter
issued by the Department of Labor. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 ("Interpretations such as
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any bright line tests to define when it was appropriate to use the Chevron
analysis, the Court suggested in Mead that the Chevron analysis should
be used "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority.' 70 According to the Court, the delegation of
interpretive power "may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's
power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or
by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.''. Not
surprisingly, some academics saw the Mead decision as further erosion of
172Chevron deference. In many of the recent cases where the Court did
not accord Chevron deference to the agency's interpretations, the Court
suggested that the agency decisions could be accorded deference under
the Skidmore v. Swift & Co.' standard.7  According to the Court's
decision in Skidmore, the degree of deference to which an agency's
interpretation is entitled "in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.' 75 Most
commentators agree, though, that courts are much more likely to uphold
agency decisions under the Chevron analysis than under Skidmore.
76
those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant
Chevron-style deference."). In Mead, the Court refused to apply Chevron to review a
tariff classification ruling that the U.S. Customs Service issued regarding day planners.
Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27; see also infra note 170 and accompanying text.
170. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
171. Id. at 227.
172. See, e.g., Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States
v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 289-90 (2002) (suggesting that Mead could be a "fault
line" in administrative law and as dramatic a shift as Chevron).
173. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
174. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268-69 (2006); Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-
35. For a concise discussion of the differences between Chevron deference and Skidmore
deference, see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 168, at 852-56.
175. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
176. After Chevron, commentators generally recognized an "increased level of judicial
deference to agency interpretations." Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2637, 2645 & n.35 (2003) (collecting sources); see, e.g., Schuck & Elliott, supra
note 161, at 1030-31, 1060. Cf Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 59
(1998) ("[T]he presence of pre-Chevron traditional factors does not exert a strong
influence on results; their impact is weak, and perhaps nonexistent."). A few recent
studies have found that courts uphold agency interpretations under the Skidmore test only
about one-third of the time. In an empirical study of federal cases decided in the four
months after the Supreme Court issued the Mead decision, Eric Womack found that
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In addition to Christensen and Mead, the Court refused to accord
Chevron deference to agencies in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.177 and Gonzales v. Oregon. 17 In Brown & Williamson, the Court
reviewed the FDA's regulations governing smokeless tobacco and
cigarettes." 9 Although the Court applied the Chevron analysis, the Court
interpreted the statute, at Step One, to clearly preclude the FDA from
regulating tobacco products.' 80 In Gonzales, the Court examined an
interpretive rule issued by the Attorney General that concluded that
prescribing drugs for assisted suicide was not a legitimate medical
purpose and therefore violated the Controlled Substances Act. Finding
that the Controlled Substances Act did not grant the Attorney General
the authority to prohibit a medical practice otherwise permissible under
state law, the Court refused to accord Chevron deference to the Attorney
General's rule.
182
While some commentators suggested that the Court's opinions in
Christensen, Mead, Brown & Williamson, and Gonzales signaled an
erosion of Chevron deference,"3 the Supreme Court issued another
opinion during that time period that limited the reach of Christensen and
Mead. In Barnhart v. Walton, the Court suggested that agency letters,
manuals, and other informal agency decisions could be entitled to
Chevron deference. 184 The Court suggested factors to consider in
determining whether to apply the Chevron analysis, including the
"interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
courts upheld the agency's decision when applying the Skidmore test only 31% of the
time. See Womack, supra note 172, at 327-28. In contrast, Womack found that in the
cases he examined that were decided prior to the Supreme Court's Christensen decision,
courts upheld the agency's decision when applying the Skidmore test 75% of the time. Id.
at 327. In a recent article, Professor Amy Wildermuth suggested that the post-Mead gap
between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference may be less pronounced than
Womack found, but that the gap does exist. Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of
Mead and Christensen: What Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1899
(2006). In the cases she examined arising after the cases Womack analyzed, the courts
upheld the agency's decision under the Skidmore test only 39% of the time. Id.
177. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
178. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
179. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 131.
180. Id. at 132-33.
181. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 252-55.
182. Id. at 258-61; id. at 268 ("[T]he CSA does not give the Attorney General
authority to issue the Interpretive Rule as a statement with the force of law.").
183. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 35, at 762-64; supra note 172 and accompanying
text.
184. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219-20 (2002) (Breyer, J.).
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Agency has given the question over a long period of time. ' '  Justice
Breyer's articulation of the factors to be considered at Chevron Step
Zero seemed to reduce the importance to the deference analysis of the
formality of the procedures used by the agency to make its decision.
While the Supreme Court refused to accord Chevron deference to
agencies in a few high profile cases at the beginning of this century,
commentators also noted that the Court seemed to be citing Chevron less
frequently in its opinions.9 6 For instance, comparing her own review of
the Supreme Court's decisions in the 2005-2006 Term to the findings of a
1992 study by Professor Thomas Merrill, Professor Linda Jellum
concluded that "the Court has reduced its citations from ten to twenty
per year to approximately three to five.""'
Despite those forecasts of doom for Chevron deference, there are
many reasons to believe that the reports of its demise, like Mark Twain's,
have been "greatly exaggerated. '"1'8 Regarding the number of Supreme
Court citations, Professor Jellum herself recognizes that the total number
of opinions that the Court has been issuing in the decade since Professor
Merrill's study has declined sharply.189 In addition, as Professor Richard
Pierce has noted, the increased deference accorded agencies by courts in
the wake of Chevron has likely influenced litigants in their decisions
regarding whether to challenge agency actions and what arguments to
raise if they challenge those decisions.9 Accordingly, it is difficult to say
that a reduction in the number of times that Chevron is cited by courts
necessarily means that courts are according agencies less deference.
Nevertheless, if the number of citations to Chevron has any significance
in determining the level of deference accorded to agencies, it should be
noted that the number of citations is actually increasing. In a much
broader study not limited to Supreme Court opinions, Professors
Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein found that Chevron was cited over two
thousand times in the first five years of this century, which is almost as
many times as it was cited in the first ten years after the Court issued the
185. Id. at 222.
186. See, e.g., Jellum, supra note 7, at 772-73.
187. Id.
188. See THE OXFORD DICrIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 786 (Elizabeth Knowles ed.,
5th ed. 1999) (citing Mark Twain quote regarding reports of his death made to the New
York Journal on June 2, 1897).
189. See Jellum, supra note 7, at 772-73.
190. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron Should Not Be Converted into a Voting Rule:
A Response to Gersen and Vermeule's Proposal, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 248, 249-50
(2006), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/25/pierce.html.
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decision."' The Supreme Court itself cited the decision ten times in
2006.'92
Although commentators have forecast the demise of Chevron for
decades, many agree with Professor Sunstein that "the decision has
become foundational . . .- the undisputed starting point for any
assessment of the allocation of authority between federal courts and
administrative agencies." '193 Several developments in the 2006 Term
suggest that Chevron retains, and has even increased, that influence.
B. Developments in the 2006 Term
While the Supreme Court may have narrowed the scope of agency
actions subject to Chevron analysis in recent Terms, the Court expanded
Chevron's reach in the 2006 Term when it applied the analysis to review
an agency's denial of a petition for rulemaking in Massachusetts v.
EPA.'94 This was not a major expansion, as the Court routinely applies
Chevron to the review of an agency's legislative rules, but it was an
expansion nonetheless. Similarly, in Long Island Care at Home, the
Court applied Chevron to uphold a rule that was labeled by the agency as
an "interpretation. "195
The Court also deferred to agency interpretations of statutes on issues
that seemed to be within the province of the courts, rather than within
the specialized expertise of the agency. As noted above, in National
Ass'n of Home Builders, the Court reconciled a conflict between two
federal statutes by deferring to agency regulations, rather than relying on
traditional tools of statutory construction to resolve the conflict."'
Similarly, in Watters, the Court decided that the agency's regulatory
determination that a federal statute preempted a state law was valid,
although the Court reached that conclusion without moving to Chevron
Step Two 97 As commentators have noted, in prior Terms, the Court was
much more willing to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute
191. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 19, at 824 n.2.
192. See cases cited supra note 12.
193. Sunstein, supra note 168, at 188.
194. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
195. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007). Admittedly,
although the challenger claimed that the rule was an interpretive rule, the Court did not
label the rule as legislative or interpretive, and there is a decent argument that the rule at
issue in the case was a legislative rule.
196. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007); see
also supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
197. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); see also supra notes 113-20 and
accompanying text. While the majority did not claim to be deferring to the agency's
regulations, the dissent charged that the Court's ruling "affects the allocation of powers
among sovereigns." Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 57:1
Bringing Deference Back
when the interpretation involved a question of agency expertise rather
than when the interpretation turned on a "[miajor [q]uestion.
''
However, the statutory interpretation issues in National Ass'n of Home
Builders and Watters and seemed to focus more on major questions than
on matters of agency expertise.
The Court did not profess to change the analysis to be used at Chevron
Step Zero in the 2006 Term. In three of the opinions, the Court cited
factors identified by Justice Breyer in Barnhart as appropriate factors to
use when determining whether Chevron applies.' 99 In each of the cases,
the Court noted that the statutory interpretation question involved an
issue of agency expertise.0 However, the Court seemed more willing
this Term than in other recent Terms to apply the Chevron analysis to
issues that involved something other than agency expertise. The multi-
factor Barnhart analysis has provided the Court with significant flexibility
to apply Chevron even to major questions of statutory interpretation.
Another subtle shift toward deference to agencies was apparent in the
blurring of the steps of the Chevron analysis in many of the decisions
handed down by the Court in the 2006 Term. As noted earlier, an
increase in the use of textualism at Chevron Step One will often reduce
the likelihood that a court will find a statute ambiguous and move to
Chevron Step Two.'O It will also reduce the likelihood that a court will
examine the purpose and legislative history of statutes, because that
analysis would only occur at Step Two in determining whether an
agency's interpretation of a statute is reasonable. Although the Court
did not move away from a textualist approach to statutory interpretation
in Chevron Step One in the 2006 Term, several of the Court's opinions
reduced the impact of the textualist approach and opened the door to
increased consideration of a statute's purpose and legislative history by
blurring or blending the steps of Chevron. °2
The clearest example of the blurring is apparent in Zuni. In that case,
Justice Breyer began the Chevron analysis with Step Two instead of Step
One and focused heavily on the statute's purpose and legislative
history.0 3 He stressed that his determination at Chevron Step One
198. Sunstein, supra note 168, at 193-94; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead
Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1459-62 (2005).
199. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2354; Long Island Care at Home,
127 S. Ct. at 2346; Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1541
(2007).
200. See supra note 199.
201. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
202. The Court actually has been blurring the Chevron steps together for several
Terms. See Bressman, supra note 35, at 787-88.
203. Zuni, 127 S. Ct. at 1541-43. Justice Kennedy, with Justice Alito, wrote separately
to express concern about the inversion of the Chevron analysis. They feared the inversion
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regarding whether the statute's language was ambiguous, was
"illuminate[d]" by the analysis of the statute's purpose and legislative
20history at Step Two. Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, clearly
viewed the Court's decision as having dodged a textualist Chevron Step
One analysis, and accused the Court of resurrecting the landmark
201Church of the Holy Trinity decision.
Global Crossing was another case in which the Court focused on the
legislative history, regulatory history, and purpose of the statute inS 206
upholding the agency's regulations. The Court relied on these factors
to determine that Congress left a "'gap"' for the agency to fill in
interpreting the statute.2 7 The blurring of the steps is quite evident in
this case, as it is not clear whether the Court examined the history and
purpose of the statute at Step Two to illuminate whether the statute was
ambiguous at Step One, or whether the Court examined them to
determine, at Chevron Step Zero, that it was appropriate to use the
Chevron analysis to uphold the agency's regulations.""
Finally, in Duke Energy, the Court relied, in part, on the different
purposes of the two programs at issue to determine, at Chevron Step
One, that the statute was ambiguous, and that it was appropriate to
uphold the agency's conflicting regulatory definitions of a statutory term
as it applied to the different programs. °9 In Duke Energy, Global
Crossing, and Zuni, therefore, the Court found ways to give important
weight to legislative history and statutory purposes, despite adherence to
a textualist Chevron Step One.
could lead people to conclude that the Court was interpreting statutes based on policy
concerns. Id. at 1551 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra note 93 and accompanying
text. However, they did not believe that the ordering of the analysis affected the outcome
of the Court's decision, and gave "deference to the author of an opinion in matters of
exposition." Id.
204. Id. at 1541 (majority opinion). Even in Zuni, the Court adhered to a textualist
approach to Step One. As Justice Breyer wrote, "neither the legislative history nor the
reasonableness of the Secretary's method would be determinative if the plain language of
the statute unambiguously indicated that Congress sought to foreclose the Secretary's
interpretation." Id. at 1543.
205. Id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1513, 1516-17 (2007).
207. Id. at 1522.
208. See id. at 1520-22.
209. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1428, 1433-34 (2007).
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IV. A UER AND CHENERY IN THE 2006 TERM
A. Developments Regarding Auer v. Robbins
Just as the Court appeared to accord greater deference to agencies in
their interpretations of statutes in the 2006 Term, the Court appeared to
revitalize Auer deference to agencies' interpretations of their own
regulations. In 1997, in Auer v. Robbins, the Supreme Court held that an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations is "controlling unless
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 0 This standard,
which is even more deferential than Chevron deference, was initially set
forth by the Court in 1945 in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co."'
Courts have accorded deference to agency interpretations of their own
regulations under Auer even when the agencies have initially advanced
those interpretations in the course of litigation.2t2
However, academic criticism of Auer deference rose dramatically after
the Court's decision in United States v. Mead."3 As noted above, the
Mead court refused to accord Chevron deference to an agency decision
through informal adjudication, and suggested that Skidmore deference
might be appropriate instead. 14 Justice Scalia, in dissent, suggested that
application of the less deferential Skidmore standard of review for
informal agency decisions, coupled with the vitality of Auer deference to
agency interpretations of their own regulations, would encourage
agencies to promulgate broadly worded legislative rules that they could
subsequently "clarify" through interpretive rules that are entitled to Auer
deference."' Some academics have suggested that Auer deference should
be limited to interpretations in formats that would be entitled to Chevron
210. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
211. 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945).
212. See, e.g., Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2005); In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2004). Cf.
Alliance to Prot. Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 398 F.3d 105, 112 (1st
Cir. 2005); Soltane v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 148 (3d Cir. 2004). Auer itself
upheld an agency interpretation first articulated in that case. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
213. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 198, at 1491-92; William Funk, Legislating for
Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2004); John F. Manning,
Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893,943-44 (2004).
214. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
215. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that "[a]gencies will now
have high incentive to rush out barebones, ambiguous rules construing statutory
ambiguities, which they can then in turn further clarify through informal rulings entitled to
judicial respect." Id.
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do 216deference, or that courts should accord the same degree of deference to
agencies' interpretations of regulations and statutes.217  Most
commentators have agreed, though, that the continuing vitality of Auer
after Mead creates an incentive for agencies to avoid diminished
Skidmore deference by adopting broad, ambiguous legislative rules.18
The Court appeared to narrow the scope of Auer deference somewhat
in 2006 in Gonzales v. Oregon.219 First, the Court reaffirmed the basic
principle of Auer that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is
entitled to substantial deference. However, Gonzales then created an
exception to Auer by holding that the Court will not accord such
deference to an agency interpretation of a regulation that merely restatesor praprase th stautoy "221
or paraphrases the statutory language. The Court stressed that "the
question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the
statute. An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own
words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a
regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.,
222
The exception that the Gonzales Court created thus addresses some of
the concerns raised by critics after the Mead decision.223 Furthermore, in
Gonzales the Court also described another, longer-standing limit to Auer
deference. The Court suggested that the Attorney General's
interpretation of his regulation was also not entitled to Auer deference
because "the current interpretation runs counter to the 'intent at the time
of the regulation's promulgation.'
24
While Gonzales seemed to impose restrictions on Auer deference, the
Court issued two opinions that sent a clear message that Auer remains
vital. First, in Long Island Care at Home, the Court accorded Auer
deference to an agency's interpretation of a rule that it had labeled
merely an "interpretation" and that the challenger asserted was an
225interpretive rule. The Court accorded Auer deference to the agency's
216. Cf. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 168, at 899-900 (discussing the Seminole Rock
& Sand Co. articulation of deference).
217. See Funk, supra note 213, at 1026.
218. See supra note 213.
219. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
220. Id. at 914.
221. Id. at 915.
222. Id. at 916.
223. After Gonzales, although an agency might still adopt a broadly-worded,
ambiguous regulation to be fleshed out in interpretive rules, the broad wording of the
regulation cannot simply restate or paraphrase the statutory language or the agency's
subsequent interpretations will not be accorded Auer deference. See id. at 915-16.
224. Id. at 916 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
225. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2349-50 (2007).
Although the Court did not ultimately label the rule as an interpretive rule or legislative
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interpretation of the third party regulation even though the agency's
interpretation of the rule had changed over time and even though the
new interpretation was adopted in an advisory memorandum to internal
226agency personnel as part of the litigation. While the Court frequently
accorded Auer deference to informal agency statements, including
litigation positions, in the past, the Court's decision to defer to the
agency despite the agency's reversal of prior interpretations of the
regulation in question seemed to conflict with the precedent cited by the
Court in Gonzales.227
Later in the Term, the Supreme Court decided National Ass'n of
Home Builders. On review, the Court accorded Auer deference to the
agency's new interpretation of the requirement of its own act even
though the new interpretation was adopted in a different administrative
proceeding after the agency's action in the case before the Court, and
even though the new interpretation conflicted with the interpretation
28that the agency adopted in forty-four proceedings. The Court's
decision was routine in the respect that it involved an agency's
interpretation of a legislative rule, rather than an interpretive rule, and in
that, as noted above, it was consistent with the Court's (and lower
courts') practice of according Auer deference to agencies' litigation
positions.22 ' However, it was an important decision in that, as in the
Long Island Care at Home case, the Court accorded Auer deference to
an agency's interpretations despite the change from its long-standing
interpretations.
B. Chenery and National Ass'n of Home Builders
The Court's opinion in the National Ass'n of Home Builders case was
significant not only for the manner in which the Court applied Chevron
and Auer deference, but for the manner in which it failed to apply SEC v.
Chenery Corp. Chenery, the Court's landmark decision from 1943,
involved review of a Securities and Exchange Commission order
approving a reorganization of a public utility holding company.23
Although the Court determined that the agency's order might have been
valid if the agency had issued the order based on the agency's expertise
rule, the Court's focus on the adoption of the rule through notice-and-comment
procedures and the binding nature of the rule suggest that it was more likely a legislative
rule than an interpretive rule.
226. Id.
227. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
228. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2530-32,
2537-38 (2007).
229. See cases cited supra note 212.
230. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 81 (1943).
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in administering and interpreting the statute, the agency claimed, at the
time it issued its order, that it based the order on its interpretation of thepriorjudical . 231
prior judicial precedent. The Chenery Court, concluding that the
agency had misinterpreted the prior precedent, held that "an
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which
the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its
action can be sustained., 232 For over six decades since the case was
decided, courts have routinely held that agency actions will not be upheld
unless they are supported by the basis articulated by the agency at the
time of its decision, rather than post hoc rationalizations.
However, the Court seemed to ignore that precedent in National Ass'n
of Home Builders. As noted above, while the EPA was in the process of
reviewing Arizona's application to administer the CWA permitting
program, the EPA appeared to interpret the ESA to require the EPA to
214
first consult with the FWS before approving the application. The EPA
approved the transfer of the permitting program after it had in fact
consulted with the FWS.2 35 After the EPA was sued for approving the
transfer, it changed its interpretation of the ESA by arguing that the Act
did not mandate that the EPA consult with the FWS prior to approving
the transfer of CWA permitting authority.2 6 Regardless of whether the
change in interpretation was permissible or entitled to deference, the
interpretation was not articulated by the Agency as the basis for its
decision to transfer permitting authority to Arizona at the time that it
approved the transfer. In fact, that interpretation conflicted with the
position taken by the Agency at the time that it approved the transfer.
Nevertheless, instead of finding that the Agency's decision could not be
supported by the Agency's post hoc interpretation of the ESA, the Court
invoked the rule that it would "'uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.' 237 The Court
ultimately upheld the EPA's decision to transfer permitting authority to
Arizona based on this new interpretation of the requirements of the
231. Id. at 92-93.
232. Id. at 95.
233. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539
(1981); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
234. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2526-28
(2007).
235. Id. at 2527-28.
236. Id. at 2530. The EPA adopted that interpretation of the statute in reviewing a
subsequent request by the State of Alaska for the transfer of CWA permitting authority.
Id. at 2530 n.5.
237. Id. at 2530 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
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ESA, a basis that was not articulated by the Agency at the time of its
decision.]
V. RATIONALES FOR THE SHIFT TOWARDS DEFERENCE
To the extent that the Court, in the 2006 Term, accorded federal
agencies more deference, there are a few explanations for the shift. The
most obvious explanation for the shift is the elevation of Justice Alito to
the Court to replace Justice O'Connor. Justice Alito voted much more
consistently in favor of the government in the 2006 Term than Justice
O'Connor had in the past.239 After only one Term, it is hard to forecast
whether Justice Alito will continue to support the government as
strongly in the future, but his votes clearly made a difference in the 2006
Term.
The shift could also be explained by research conducted by Professors
Miles and Sunstein, among others, which suggests that political ideology
plays an important role in judicial decisionmaking.24 ° While that research
could explain the shift in deference in the 2006 Term, it also suggests that
the shift could be transitory and that the Court might accord less
deference to agency decisions when control of the White House is passed
on to another administration. Significantly, since none of the Court's
opinions purported to overturn important administrative law precedents
or change important tests, the Court can easily re-interpret the precedent
in a manner that is less deferential to the government in future years.
There may be, of course, a more benign explanation for the apparent
shift in judicial deference to agency decisionmaking, at least with regard
to Chevron deference. Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman suggests that a
court will overturn an agency's decisions, despite Chevron, when the
agency "act[s] undemocratically either by disregarding likely
congressional preferences or public engagement on an issue of social
concern."'242 Viewed in that light, the Court's opinions in the 2006 Term
are fairly consistent with the body of prior precedent.
241
A. The Impact of Justice Alito
While Justice Kennedy may have wielded the most power on the Court
this past Term,2" Justice Alito's elevation to the Court to replace Justice
238. Id. at 2538.
239. See infra Part V.A.
240. See infra Part V.B.
241. See infra Part V.B.
242. Bressman, supra note 35, at 798.
243. See infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 32.
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O'Connor may have had the greatest impact on the Court's
administrative law jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor was a moderate
voice on the Court. According to a study of the Justices' voting records
prepared by Professors Miles and Sunstein, Justice O'Connor voted to
validate agency actions in Chevron cases about 67% of the time,245 while
Justices Scalia and Thomas voted to validate agency actions only about• 246
50% of the time, and Justices Souter and Breyer voted to validateS 241
agency actions almost 80% of the time. Professors Miles and Sunstein
also found that Justice O'Connor's voting record was not significantly
different when the Court reviewed the actions of a Democratic
administration rather than those of a Republican administration.
While Justice O'Connor voted to validate agency actions in 67% of the
Chevron cases in prior Terms, Justice Alito supported the government's
position in seven of the eight Chevron cases in the 2006 Term (87.5%),
more than any other Justice on the Court. 9
A closer look at some of Justice O'Connor's prior opinions in Chevron
and Auer cases demonstrates that Justice Alito's appointment had
important repercussions for the eight cases of the 2006 Term. First,
Justice O'Connor was an ardent advocate of states' rights and wrote a
strong opinion about Chevron and preemption in Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr"5 A majority of the Court in Medtronic relied heavily on the
FDA's interpretation of a federal law to conclude that the plaintiff's state
common law tort claims against the manufacturer of a pacemaker were
not preempted.5  Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring and dissenting
opinion, in which she cautioned that "[i]t is not certain that an agency
regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is
entitled to deference., 252 Accordingly, if she had been on the Court this
past Term, it is unlikely that she would have joined the majority in
Watters in interpreting a federal law, per the regulations of a federal
agency, to necessarily preempt state regulation of national bank
subsidiaries.5 Justice Alito joined the 5-3 majority in Watters; thus
245. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 19, at 832 tbl.1.
246. Id. Justice Scalia voted to validate the decisions in 52.2% of the cases, while
Justice Thomas voted to validate agency decisions in 53.6% of the cases. Id.
247. Id. Justice Souter voted to validate agency decisions in 77% of the cases, while
Justice Breyer voted to validate the decisions in 81.8% of the cases. Id.
248. Id. Justice O'Connor voted to validate agency actions in 65.5% of the cases for
Democratic Administrations and in 69.4% of the cases for Republican Administrations.
Id.
249. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
250. 518 U.S. 470, 509 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. Id. at 496-97 (majority opinion).
252. Id. at 512 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572-73 (2007).
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Watters would likely have been a 4-4 decision had Justice Alito not
replaced Justice O'Connor.24
Justice Alito's replacement of Justice O'Connor may also have had an
impact in the cases involving the application of Auer this past Term. In
2006, Justice O'Connor joined the Court's majority in Gonzales, which
limited Auer deference by creating an exception for certain regulations
and by stressing that less deference is due when the agency has changed
its interpretation of a regulation over time."' While Justice O'Connor
joined in the majority in Gonzales, Justice Alito joined the majority in
both cases that reinvigorated Auer, and authored the Court's opinion in
National Ass'n of Home Builders, a 5-4 decision.256
B. Political Ideology
While Justice Alito's elevation to the Supreme Court seems to have
swung the pendulum toward increased deference for agencies during the
2006 Term, research by Professors Miles and Sunstein, among others,
suggests that the shift may be transitory if the Justices' decisionmaking is
motivated by political ideology.
Theoretically, the Court's Chevron decision should have reduced the
role of policy judgments in judicial review of agency decisionmaking. 7
Under the two part Chevron test, if a statute is ambiguous, it is the
agency, rather than the court, that is charged with making policy, and the
court should defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute as long as
it is reasonable. While early studies indicated that Chevron significantly
increased the rate of judicial deference to agency decisions, recent
observers are more skeptical.
For instance, Professors Miles and Sunstein reviewed the
decisionmaking of Supreme Court Justices and federal appellate court
judges in Chevron cases to determine whether application of the test has
254. See id. at 1563-64. Justice Thomas did not take part in consideration of the case.
Id. at 1564.
255. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256-58 (2006); see also supra notes 221 & 224
and accompanying text.
256. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2524
(2007); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2343 (2007) (unanimous
decision).
257. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 19, at 823.
258. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 161, at 1032-34; see also Miles & Sunstein, supra
note 19, at 824-25.
259. See infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text. Dissenting in Massachusetts v.
EPA, Justice Scalia expressed his displeasure with the manner in which he viewed the
Court to be misapplying Chevron, writing that "[e]vidently, the Court defers only to those
reasonable interpretations that it favors." 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1476 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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truly reduced judicial policymaking. The two-step analysis should, in
theory, "eliminate systematic differences [in decisionmaking] among
judges along political lines," so that the rate at which judges validate
agency actions should be fairly uniform, and should not correlate to the
ideology of the judges.2' ° However, in reviewing the decisionmaking of
Supreme Court Justices, Professors Miles and Sunstein found that the
rate of validation of agency actions varied by almost 30% across the
* 261
Justices .
More importantly, Professors Miles and Sunstein found that at the
Supreme Court level political ideology played an important role ind • • i. 262
decisionmaking. Significantly, they concluded that (1) "liberal"
* 263Justices voted to validate agency decisions more often than
"conservative" Justices in general;261 (2) the rate at which the Justices
validated agency decisions seemed to be significantly influenced by" 65
whether the agency interpretation was liberal or conservative; and (3)
the rate at which the Justices validated agency decisions seemed to be
significantly influenced by the political party of the administration whose
260. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 19, at 827-28. Similarly, application of the Chevron
test should reduce variation in statutory interpretation within the federal appellate courts.
Id. at 824 & n.8 (citing Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency
Actions, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121-22 (1987)). Miles and Sunstein refer to this
hypothesis as the "doctrinal hypothesis" and contrast it with the "realist" and "formalist"
hypotheses regarding the application of Chevron. Id. at 828-29 (emphasis omitted). The
realist hypothesis suggests that "judges are more likely to validate [agency actions] when
the agency's conclusion conforms with their policy judgments, regardless of whether the
statutory text is clear or ambiguous." Id. at 828. The formalist hypothesis suggests that
judges who adopt a "'plain meaning"' approach to statutory interpretation are more likely
to invalidate agency decisions than judges who do not take that approach. Id. The study
ultimately found support for the "realist" hypothesis, rather than the "doctrinal"
hypothesis. See id. at 870.
261. Id. at 831; see supra notes 246-47.
262. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 19, at 825-26.
263. Miles & Sunstein identified Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg as
"liberal" Justices in their study, and they identified Justices Scalia and Thomas as
"conservative." Id. at 832-33. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were not labeled either
way, and the study did not examine the voting records of Chief Justice Roberts or Justice
Alito. See id.
264. Id. at 823, 826, 832 & tbl.1. Miles and Sunstein noted that "Justice Breyer, the
Court's most vocal critic of a strong reading of Chevron, is the most deferential justice in
practice, while Justice Scalia, the Court's most vocal Chevron enthusiast, is the least
deferential." Id. at 826 (footnotes omitted).
265. Id. at 823, 826-27. Miles and Sunstein labeled agency decisions as "liberal" or
"conservative" for purposes of the study "by reference to the identity of the party
challenging" them. Id. at 830. For instance, if an agency decision were challenged by an
industry group, Miles and Sunstein labeled the decision as liberal. Id.
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266decisions were being reviewed. Miles and Sunstein ultimately
concluded that "the most conservative members of the Supreme Court
show significantly increased validation of agency interpretations after
President Bush succeeded President Clinton.
26
1
In a study of Chevron decisions in the federal appellate courts in 1995
and 1996, Professor Orin Kerr also concluded that there was "a tendency
for Republican and Democratic judges to reach results consistent with
261their political ideologies" in cases with clear political ramifications.
266. Id. at 823, 826. In analyzing data for this portion of the study, Miles and Sunstein
focused on the identity of the political party in power at the time of the Court's decision.
Id. at 830. While they recognized that in some cases the agency decisions under review
could have been made by a prior administration, they thought it was appropriate to
identify those cases with the administration in power at the time of the Court's decision,
because the new administration could change the agency's substantive and/or litigation
position. Id.
267. Id. at 823. While Miles and Sunstein also noted that liberal Justices voted to
validate agency decisions less frequently when reviewing decisions of a Republican
administration than a Democratic administration, the difference was much less dramatic
than for the most conservative Justices. Id. at 826. Miles and Sunstein noted that "the
validation rates of the conservative justices appear more sensitive to the presidential
administration," id. at 833, but also noted that an alternative classification of Court
decisions would show the same sensitivity in the liberal Justices, id. at 834.
268. See Kerr, supra note 176, at 39. Kerr examined 250 applications of the Chevron
doctrine in more than 200 cases of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Id. at 4. In his research,
Kerr sought to discover whether courts continued to apply the pre-Chevron factors in
determining whether to defer to agency decisions; whether courts were motivated by
political factors; or whether courts' deference to agencies depended on whether judges
adopted a "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation. Id. at 3-4. Regarding the
"political" theory, Kerr noted that in cases involving denials of entitlement benefits,
Republican judges upheld the denials in every case, while Democratic judges upheld the
denials in only 40% of the cases. Id. at 38-39. He also found that in immigration appeals,
"Republican judges sided with the government against the individual 71% of the time,
while Democratic judges did so only 42% of the time." Id. at 39. Further, he found that in
cases involving commerce, trade, and taxes, where "deferral to the executive branch would
further liberal policies," Democratic judges upheld agency actions in 92% of the cases,
while Republican judges upheld agency actions in only 68% of the cases. Id. at 39-40.
Although Kerr found that many judges reached conclusions consistent with their political
ideologies in cases with clear political ramifications, id., he did not find, as he had
hypothesized, see id. at 35-36, that "the strength of a judge's inclination to apply and defer
[to an agency] under Chevron depends on how much the judge agrees with the politics of
the administration whose interpretations are being reviewed," id. at 11, 36.
Not all commentators agree, however, that the courts' application of Chevron is driven
by political ideology. In a recent article, Professor Richard Pierce pointed out that, in a
1997 study of 250 environmental decisions in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, Professor Richard Revesz found "no statistically significant difference" in the
application of Chevron to those cases by Republican or Democratic judges. See Pierce,
supra note 190, at 250 (discussing Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology,
and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1748 & tbl.7 (1997)). Pierce asserted that
Revesz's study showed that Chevron's framework is "relatively objective and
determinate." Id. Pierce acknowledged, though, that the Miles and Sunstein study
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In light of the findings of those studies, the results in the 2006 Term of
the Supreme Court are not surprising. According to Miles and Sunstein's
data, although the identity of the administration in power has some effect
on the decisionmaking of liberal judges, most of the liberal Justices on
the Supreme Court validate agency decisions more than 75% of the time
even when the decisions are made by a Republican administration.269 At
the same time, the most conservative Justices, who validate agency
decisions less than 50% of the time when they are made by a Democratic
administration, validate agency decisions at least 60% of the time when• • • 270
they are made by a Republican administration. The convergence of the
traditionally high validation rate for liberal Justices, and the increased
validation rate for conservative Justices when reviewing decisions of a
Republican administration, combined with the elevation of Justice Alito,
who supported the government's position in 87.5% of the cases in 2006,271
seems to explain the increased deference for agency decisions.
Based on the foregoing, if there is a change in the political power of
the administration whose policies are under review, it is reasonable to
conclude that the validation rate for the Court's conservative Justices will
decline. If Justice Alito's validation rate also declines, the Court may,
once again, reduce the deference accorded to agency decisionmaking.
C. Democratic Decisionmaking
As noted above, there may be a more benign explanation for the
apparent shift in judicial deference to agency decisionmaking, at least
with regard to Chevron deference. In a recent article, Professor
Bressman explored the Court's decisions in Brown & Williamson and
Gonzales.272 While some commentators suggested that the cases signaled
an erosion in Chevron deference by the Court, she searched for other
explanations for the Court's reluctance to accord Chevron deference to
demonstrated that Chevron has less effectively de-politicized judicial review of agency
decisions in the Supreme Court than it has in the lower courts. Id. at 251.
269. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 19, at 832 & tbl.1. Justices Ginsburg, Souter,
and Breyer voted to validate agency decisions 76.2%, 76.7%, and 80% of the time,
respectively. Id. at 832 tbl.1.
270. Id. at 832-33. Justice Scalia voted to validate agency decisions in 41.9% of the
cases involving a Democratic administration, but in 60.5% of the cases involving a
Republican administration. Id. at 832 tbl.1. Similarly, Justice Thomas' validation rate was
48.4% for Democratic administrations and 60% for Republican administrations. Id.
271. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. As noted above, Justice O'Connor,
whom Justice Alito replaced, validated agency decisions in about 67% of the cases,
regardless of whether the administration in power was Democratic or Republican. See
supra note 30.
272. See generally Bressman, supra note 35 ("This Article seeks to reconcile the
Chevron framework with Brown & Williamson and Gonzales.").
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agencies in those cases. While noting that Chevron deference is based, in
part, on the political accountability of administrative agencies, Professor
Bressman asserted that other factors must be playing a more significant
role in influencing the Court's determinations of whether or not to
accord Chevron deference to agency decisions. 3
On close examination of the cases, Professor Bressman concluded that
the Court, in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales, withheld deference
from agencies in those cases because the Democratic and Republican
administrations, "although electorally accountable, had interpreted
broad delegations in ways that were undemocratic when viewed in the
larger legal and social contexts. 274 Regarding Brown & Williamson, she
asserted that "the administration had . . . take[n] an action that the
current Congress likely opposed," while in Gonzales, she asserted that
"the administration had ... take[n] a position on an issue that the people
actively were debating, without involving or ascertaining the views of the
public. 275 In both cases, she concluded that "[p]olitical accountability
was not functioning as an adequate check on the administrations'
conduct." 276 Consequently, she speculated that:
The Supreme Court may be driving at a rule of statutory
construction that pursues a goal different from and counter to
traditional notions of political accountability. That rule asks
whether the administration has acted undemocratically either
by disregarding likely congressional preferences or public
engagement on an issue of social concern.
Ultimately, she concluded that "Chevron might be premised on
judicially recognized values, including formal accountability and
expertise, [but] it may not be limited to those values. Rather, Chevron
might also include both procedural regularity, as in Mead, and functional
accountability, as in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales.,278
The approach taken by the Court in its resolution of the Chevron cases
in the 2006 Term seems to be consistent with the approach suggested by
Professor Bressman. In the six cases where the Court upheld the
279position taken by an agency, the disputes did not seem to center onissues where the administration was making a decision that ignored
273. Id. at 762-64.
274. Id. at 764.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 798.
278. Id. at 786-87 (footnote omitted).
279. See supra note 27.
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public input, or that Congress likely opposed]m At the same time,
Massachusetts v. EPA, the most significant case in which the Court
refused to defer to an agency during the 2006 Term, could easily be seen
as a case where the administration was making a decision that
disregarded public engagement on an issue of social concern or likely
congressional preferences. While the administration was deciding that it
was inappropriate to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles under the Clean Air Act, Congress was debating ways to amend
the Clean Air Act to increase regulation of greenhouse gasses.28'
Professor Bressman's approach can also explain the Court's decision in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Professor Bressman
recognized that procedural regularity-in addition to functional
accountability-is an important factor for courts in deciding whether to
accord Chevron deference to an agency's decision. 282  The Court's
decision to refuse to accord deference to the EEOC's policy manual in
Ledbetter is, thus, fully consistent with the Court's precedent in Mead,
Christensen, and other cases that focused on the procedural regularity of
283agency decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent years, academics have frequently chronicled the decline of
Chevron deference and criticized the co-existence of Auer and Mead.
While the Supreme Court created exceptions to Chevron and Auer over
the past decade, the Court seemed to reverse the trend in the 2006 Term.
The Court accorded administrative agencies more deference in the past
year, issuing several opinions that reinvigorated Chevron and Auer and
issuing an opinion that appeared to ignore Chenery. An examination of
the Justices' voting records suggests that Justice Alito's elevation to the
280. Although the issue that sparked the debate in Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423
(2007), spurred some legislative activity, many of the Congressional proposals, other than
the Bush administration's proposal, supported broader application of the new technology
and permitting requirements to modifications of power plants. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEAN AIR ACT: KEY STAKEHOLDERS' VIEWS ON REVISIONS TO
THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 12 & n.13 (2004) (listing two Republican-
introduced bills and two Democrat-introduced Congressional bills designed to "further
regulate emissions from industrial facilities"). Thus, it would be inappropriate to suggest
that Congress likely opposed the agency's position in the case. See Part II.A.6 (discussing
the dispute and the agency's litigation position in the case).
281. See, e.g., Safe Climate Act of 2006, H.R. 5642, 109th Cong. (2006); Climate
Stewardship Act of 2005, H.R. 759, 109th Cong. (2005); Climate Stewardship Act of 2005,
S. 342, 109th Cong. (2005); Climate Stewardship Act of 2004, H.R. 4067, 108th Cong.
(2004); Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003); Global Climate
Security Act of 2003, S. 17, 108th Cong. (2003).
282. Bressman, supra note 35, at 787.
283. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
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Court was the most significant impetus for the shift in the Court's
attitude toward agencies.
Although the Court applied Chevron, Auer, and other administrative
law precedents in a deferential manner in the 2006 Term, the Court did
not overturn any major precedent and did not claim to be establishing
any important new rules during the Term. The decisions were
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. Instead of adopting bright line
rules, the Court continued to rely on multi-factor tests that can be
manipulated to reach the outcome that the Court desires. To the extent
that political ideology motivates the Justices in their decisionmaking, the
manner in which the Court accorded more deference to agencies in the
2006 Term is significant because it preserves, for the Court, the power to
accord less deference to agencies in the future, without overturning
precedent or establishing new bright line rules. Professors Miles and
Sunstein's research suggests that there is a correlation between the
political party in the White House and the rate at which members of the
Court validate agency decisions. Thus, the increased deference accorded
to agencies in the past year could easily disappear with a change in the
political party in power, especially on a Court where more than one third
of the cases were decided by a 5-4 vote. For now, though, Justice Alito
seems to be bringing deference back.
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